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THE FUTURE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Caleb Epperson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In matters of truth and justice, there is no difference between
large and small problems, for issues concerning the treatment of
people are all the same.1
Following the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020,
social and political movements grew rapidly nationwide to
combat the prevalence of police brutality against AfricanAmerican communities.2 The impact of the ongoing Black Lives
Matter movement has been observed in both cities across the
United States and in related movements internationally.3 This
movement highlights the necessity for police reform and
catalyzes the public’s growing call for greater criminal justice
reform. To achieve the goals of a fundamental reform of
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law 2022. Articles Editor for
the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author sincerely thanks Professor Alex Nunn for
his guidance and advice in creating this Comment. The author also gives a special thank you
to Michael Roberson for being the initial inspiration behind this article and for the continuing
example he sets as an impassioned criminal defense attorney. The author thanks the editorial
team of the Arkansas Law Review, especially Wyatt Cross, for their diligent work. Finally,
the author would like to thank his mother, father, sister, and niece for their constant support
and encouragement not only in the process of writing this comment, but in all the author’s
adventures before and after.
1. KENJI SUGIMOTO, ALBERT EINSTEIN: A PHOTOGRAPHIC BIOGRAPHY, 166 (Astrid
Amelungse et al. eds., Schocken Books, Inc. 1989) (1987).
2. See Tim Arango et al., How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/4HZY-GJS8]; see also Elaine Godfrey, The
Enormous Scale of This Movement, ATL. (June 7, 2020, 7:58 AM), [https://perma.cc/4ULBAUBD].
3. Sophia Ankel, 30 Days that Shook America: Since the Death of George Floyd, the
Black Lives Matter Movement Has Already Changed the Country, BUS. INSIDER (June 24,
2020), [https://perma.cc/G77X-2WBE]; see also Daniel Odin Shaw & Saman Ayesha
Kidwai, The Global Impact of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) Movement, GEOPOLITICS (Aug.
21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/4ZVN-BJUQ] (explaining the rise and ongoing prevalence of
Black Lives Matter in England, France, and Belgium).
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predatory judicial practices, every aspect of the judicial process—
from arrest, trial, sentencing, and appeal—requires review.
Jury instructions are easily overlooked by the general public
during judicial reform campaigns.
However, these very
instructions threaten the reliable administration of justice if
intentionally or ignorantly misused. After attorneys rest their
cases and deliver their closing arguments, jury instructions are the
final true opportunity for either party to impact the jury’s
perception of the case.4 The instructions that a jury hears outlines
how it is to apply the given facts to the applicable legal standard.5
One such jury instruction that has led to over a century of
controversy is the Allen Charge. The Supreme Court created the
Allen Charge in its 1896 ruling Allen v. United States.6 After over
a century of use, the Allen Charge has created controversy
through its ability to empower presiding judges to force a hung
jury back into deliberations after a discordant return.7 At the heart
of the Allen Charge debate lies a single core issue—a presiding
judge’s ability to coerce jurors into agreeing to a ruling that they
do not believe is proper.8 Further, the issuance of an Allen Charge
risks depriving a criminal defendant of the tactical use of a hung
jury.9 A hung jury consists of two parties of jurors—the majority
and the minority.10 If a jury is unable to provide a unanimous
decision, the presiding judge declares a mistrial, and there are
three potential outcomes: (1) a new jury is selected and a new
trial proceeds; (2) the prosecution and defense reach an agreement

4. How Courts Work: Instructions to the Jury, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/RRF4-X8U2] [hereinafter ABA: Instructions to the Jury].
5. Id.
6. See generally Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
7. Samantha P. Bateman, Comment, Blast It All: Allen Charges and the Dangers of
Playing with Dynamite, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 323, 324 (2010).
8. See id.; Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the “Allen
Charge”, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 386-87 (1963) [hereinafter Deadlocked Juries and
Dynamite].
9. How Courts Work: Mistrials, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/5JHC-7NFJ].
10. See David M. Stanton, United States v. Arpan: How Does the Dynamite Charge
Affect Jury Determinations?, 35 S.D. L. REV. 461, 472 (1990).
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outside of court; or (3) the prosecution simply decides to drop the
charges.11
Given that the 125th anniversary of the Allen ruling passed
in December 2021, it is far past time to conclusively address the
consequences of the Allen Charge.12 Almost every federal and
state judicial system has created a unique approach to the Allen
Charge, with the widest variety of approaches being at the state
level.13 This discrepancy of practices creates an inconsistent
application of legal protections. Depending on where a defendant
faces criminal charges, the protection he or she receives is likely
different from those that a similarly situated defendant receives in
an adjacent state.14 The American Bar Association (“ABA”)
hoped to remedy these concerns upon release of its model jury
instructions in 1968.15 The ABA believed that this new model
instruction addressed the coercive aspects of the Allen Charge.16
However, while some states adopted the ABA model instructions,
not enough did so to trigger an overwhelming change in Allen
Charge practices.
To combat the prevalence of coercive Allen Charge
practices, this Comment introduces what the author has deemed
the “Post-Millennium Allen Charge.”17 This newly created Allentype instruction seeks to revitalize this withered practice to accord
with the modern legal landscape. Creating this new charge
requires a single admission; an Allen-type charge in any form
carries the risk of undue coercion. The Post-Millennium Allen
Charge seeks to limit the potential for undue coercion by
gathering beneficial elements from Allen Charge practices in the
11. How Courts Work: Jury Deliberations, AM. BAR Ass’n (Sept. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/873Q-QHJF].
12. Current as of April 2022. The Supreme Court declared its ruling on December 7,
1896. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
13. This Comment will focus specifically on the discrepancy of Allen Charge practices
among state judicial systems. A number of states recognize the use of Allen Charges for both
civil and criminal cases; however, this Comment will focus solely on case law and statutory
language that affects criminal cases.
14. See infra Appendices I-V.
15. AM. BAR ASS’N: ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CRIM. TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968).
16. Id.
17. “Post-Millennium Allen Charge” is a term of art created by the author for purposes
of identifying a new model instruction.
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fifty states. For this new model instruction to gain traction, it
must contain features that appeal to the vast majority of state
judiciaries and provide coherent instructions that leave little
discrepancy in its implementation. With this necessity for reform
in mind, this Comment seeks to accomplish two fundamental
goals. First, it categorizes and examines the Allen Charge
practices of all fifty states.18 Second, these state practices are
dissected and used to construct the newly proposed PostMillennium Allen Charge.19
Part II begins the substantive discussions of this Comment
by outlining the development of the Allen Charge. First, it
examines the history of Allen and its key predecessor case,
Commonwealth v. Tuey. Next, it highlights the most heavily
recognized—and scrutinized—features of the Allen Charge. Part
III dissects the controlling Allen Charge practices in all fifty
states. The first subsection focuses on Massachusetts and
Connecticut, states that have never formally adopted the Allen
Charge but have implemented Allen-type practices. Next, the
Comment examines the ABA’s model Allen Charge instruction
and the implementation of the instruction into state practice.
Third, the discussion turns to those states that have banned the
Allen Charge completely or in part. The final examination is of
states that have placed no limitations—or only partial
limitations—on the use of Allen Charges. Part IV concludes the
Comment with the proposed Post-Millennium Allen Charge.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLEN CHARGE
The purpose of this background section is to offer two
supporting layers of information for the analysis that follows.
First, the creation of the Allen charge is examined through an
analysis of the procedural and factual history of both Tuey20 and
Allen.21 Second, the Allen Charge’s coercive areas, as identified
18. Current through 2021. This Comment recognizes the debates regarding the Allen
Charge in the jurisdictions of Washington D.C. and other U.S. territories but has chosen to
not include them in the present discussion.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 3 (1851).
21. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896).
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by both scholars and practitioners, are examined to outline the
systemic problems within Allen-type charges. This background
knowledge serves as the skeleton frame of the analysis to follow.
A. History of the Allen Charge
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unknowingly
laid the groundwork for the Allen Charge in 1851.22 In Tuey, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the wording
and application of a set of proto-Allen instructions did not have
an undue coercive effect on the jurors.23 Specifically, the court
ruled that the presiding judge properly instructed the jurors in the
minority to reassess their perspectives after the jury returned
deadlocked.24 The court supported that minority jurors who find
that their perspectives of the case are in opposition to the majority
should use that as a hint to review the evidence.25 In his appeal,
Tuey argued that the given instructions represented an action
“equivalent to a direction.”26 Despite his best efforts, the court
upheld Tuey’s guilty verdict and laid the groundwork for the
introduction of the Allen Charge four decades later.27
By 1896, Alexander Allen had successfully appealed two
convictions for the murder of Phillip Henson.28 With the murder
taking place in Cherokee Territory, Allen’s trials took place
before the infamous “Hanging Judge” Isaac C. Parker of the
Western District of Arkansas.29 Allen’s appeals of his first two
22. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 1.
23. Id. at 3-4. “Proto” prefix is used here to represent the origin of the set of
instructions that would later become known as “Allen Charges.” Proto-, DICTIONARY.COM,
[https://perma.cc/Y2DV-TGBW] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
24. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 3-4.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 561-62 (1893) (describing reversal and
remand of Allen’s first conviction); see also Allen v. United States, 157 U.S. 675, 681 (1895)
(describing reversal and remand of Allen’s second conviction).
29. David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the United States Supreme Court
Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught Some Lessons for
Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 313-15 (2000). Judge Isaac C.
Parker received the moniker the “Hanging Judge” based on his affinity for the use of capital
punishment. Judge Isaac C. Parker, NAT’L PARK SERV., [https://perma.cc/8LT6-TZ5K]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
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convictions brought into dispute the facts regarding who initiated
the confrontation, if Allen had a duty to retreat, and whether Allen
admitted guilt when he fled the scene.30 However, Allen’s appeal
of his third murder conviction is the scene where the cornerstone
of over a century of controversy has laid.31 In this appeal, Allen
brought into dispute whether Judge Parker’s jury instruction was
unduly coercive over the minority.32 Unfortunately for Allen, the
United States Supreme Court found little merit in his claim.33
In his opinion, Justice Henry B. Brown spent little time
evaluating the merits of the instruction given by Judge Parker.34
The language of the instruction approved by the Supreme Court
in Allen came almost verbatim from Tuey.35 The relevant portions
of the instruction included:
But, in conferring together, you ought to pay proper respect
to each other’s opinions, and listen, with a disposition to be
convinced, to each other’s arguments. And, on the one hand,
if much the larger number of your panel are for a conviction,
a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his own
mind is a reasonable one, which makes no impression upon
the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself, and who have heard the same
evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to
arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath.
And, on the other hand, if a majority are for acquittal, the
minority ought seriously to ask themselves, whether they
may not reasonably, and ought not to doubt the correctness
of a judgment, which is not concurred in by most of those
with whom they are associated; and distrust the weight or
sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction
to the minds of their fellows.36

Summarizing the instruction, Justice Brown acknowledged
that the charge placed pressure on the minority out of an interest

30. Allen, 150 U.S. at 560-61; Allen, 157 U.S. at 678-80; Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492, 498-99 (1896).
31. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 501-02.
34. Id. at 501.
35. Id.
36. Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 2-3 (1851).
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to reach a unanimous verdict.37 However, in this
acknowledgment, Justice Brown found that there was no
reversible fault with the instruction.38 The deliberation process is
described by Justice Brown as an opportunity to achieve
“unanimity by a comparison of views . . . [among] equally honest,
equally intelligent” jurors.39 The opinion in Allen seems to praise
the instruction for applying pressure on those in the minority to
not “close [their] ears” from the arguments of their fellow
jurors.40 Effectively, Justice Brown argued that the deliberation
room’s purpose was to host an exchange of ideas and emotions in
an effort to obtain solidarity among the jurors.41 Despite outlining
the importance of these principles, the Justice failed to mark the
extent to which a judge may reasonably instruct jurors. Although
Justice Brown’s opinion only considered the validity of Judge
Parker’s instruction for two paragraphs, Allen has become the
principal case for this classification of jury instructions.42
B. Coercive Effects of the Allen Charge
Throughout the 1900s, a number of state judiciaries have
turned their backs on the Allen Charge, with many notably
adopting the ABA’s model instruction.43 The cited reasons why
these courts have chosen to abandon the precedent set in Allen
stems from a wariness of the Allen Charge’s inherent
coerciveness.44 When speaking of the “coercive effects” of the
Allen Charge, the focus is specifically on the ability of a presiding
judge to pressure a juror in the minority to “substitute the
majority’s opinion for his own.”45 The charge’s reputation for
37. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02.
38. Id. at 502.
39. Id. at 501.
40. Id. at 501-02.
41. Id. at 501.
42. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02; see also Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite, supra note
8, at 386.
43. J. Grant Corboy, Trial Procedure – Bombshell Instruction for Deadlocked Juries:
A.B.A Standard Replaces Allen Charge in District of Columbia, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV.
672, 676-80 (1972); Karen P. O’Sullivan, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME.
L. REV. 167, 168 (1985); see also infra Appendix II.
44. Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite, supra note 8, at 386.
45. Id. at 386-87.
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overcoming the most resilient of jurors has earned it the common
epithet as the “dynamite charge.”46 To overcome this negative
characterization, Allen Charge supporters heavily rely on the
argument that the instructions are necessary for the sake of
judicial economy.47 In essence, presiding judges must consider
the cost of conducting a new trial when determining whether
giving an Allen Charge is proper.48 In an effort to overcome the
argument of the charge’s supporters, Allen Charge dissenters have
focused on various elements within the Allen Charge that they
view as the primary roots of the coercive threat. The two broad
categories that this Comment is focused on are: (1) the undue
pressure placed on the minority; and (2) the coercive actions of
presiding judges during presentation of the charge.
1. Pressure on the Minority
The modern jury deliberation room is likely not as
captivating as it is made out to be in the hit 1957 film Twelve
Angry Men. Throughout the film, through the use of logic and
passionate speeches, the stoic hero aids his fellow jurors in
recognizing that they, the majority, were wrong in their
assumption of the defendant’s guilt.49 While these scenes may
inspire legal experts and laypeople alike, they do not represent the
reality of the dynamic between jurors.
One of the most significant threats against jury independence
is an Allen Charge that places direct pressure on the minority.50
Upon receiving an Allen instruction, jurors in the minority are

46. Paul Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal Cases: Is the Dynamite Charge
About to be Permanently Defused?, 43 MO. L. REV. 613, 615 (1978); Bateman, supra note
7, at 325.
47. Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen
Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123, 125 (1967).
48. Judicial Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
49. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
50. Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 (S.C. 2002) (explaining South Carolina’s ban
on any Allen-type instructions that mention either the minority or majority); see also
Deadlocked Juries—The “Allen Charge” is Defused—United States v. Thomas, 6 U. RICH.
L. REV. 370, 375 (1972) (describing the threat an Allen Charge poses to an independent jury
ruling) [hereinafter Deadlocked Juries: Thomas].
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more likely to change their stance than those in the majority.51
Further, the use of an Allen Charge has shown to “short-circuit
the usual leniency bias” of a jury.52 In essence, upon issuance of
an Allen Charge, jurors become more likely to shift their
perception of the case to favor a guilty verdict.53 The use of the
Allen Charge serves only to boost the majority’s morale and
allows for this party to apply undue pressure on the minority.54
The importance of protecting the minority from undue
coercion is seen once again in the discussion of hung juries. The
right to a mistrial without a unanimous verdict is crucial in the
pursuit of justice.55 While both the prosecutorial and defense
teams may indicate that a decisive ruling is preferable, to imply
that a hung jury has no place in the legal system is dangerous. As
previously discussed, those leaning towards an acquittal break
under the pressure of a majority that believes the defendant is
guilty.56 By not allowing for deadlocked juries to occur, a judge
is—in essence—depriving a defendant of a tactical tool to secure
lesser charges, have the charges against them dropped, or an
opportunity to obtain a more sympathetic jury pool.57
2. Presentation of the Allen Charge
Criticisms of the Allen Charge focus heavily on specific
aspects of the presentation of the charge that lend power to the
presiding judge to sway the deliberation process. A number of
these criticisms serve as the basis of judgments made by state
courts and legislatures nationwide. The most frequent of these

51. Vicki L. Smith & Saul M. Kassin, Effects of the Dynamite Charge on the
Deliberations of Deadlocked Mock Juries, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 632 (1993).
52. Id. at 640.
53. Id.
54. Corboy, supra note 43, at 679 (explaining that the use of the Allen Charge has the
greatest effects on jurors in the minority); see also Smith & Kassin, supra note 51, at 639.
55. See Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection
of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 569, 581-83 (2007).
56. Corboy, supra note 43, at 679; see also Smith & Kassin, supra note 51, at 639-40.
57. When a Tie is Really a Win: Hung Juries and Mistrials, SCROFANO L. (Mar. 31,
2017), [https://perma.cc/K4GK-6MWQ] (describing the possible outcomes following a hung
jury).
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criticisms are: (1) the use of “final test” language;58 (2) the
presiding judge’s knowledge of the numerical split of the jury;59
(3) the specific language used during the delivery of the
instruction;60 (4) when the presiding judge chooses to deliver the
charge;61 and (5) if the presiding judge repeats the charge after it
is first issued.62
The “final test” criticism references multiple issues
regarding the duties of the jury.63 A presiding judge who uses
“final test” language often misrepresents the duties of the jury in
order to illicit a unanimous decision.64 The presiding judge
informs jurors that they must reach a final verdict and that their
duties as jurors only end upon reaching said verdict.65 This is at
the very least a misrepresentation of the law and at most an
intentional attempt to coerce the jury into reaching a verdict
endorsed by the judge. A presiding judge takes further coercive
actions if he or she inquires about the numerical split of the jury
and uses the given information to determine if an Allen Charge is
necessary.66 However, the likelihood of coercion is lower if the
jury approaches the presiding judge regarding the split vote

58. State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, 359 Mont. 257, 264-69, 248 P.3d 817, 822-25
(defining and barring use of “final test” language).
59. Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826-28 (Del. 1994) (ruling that a presiding judge
should not inquire into the numerical split of a hung jury prior to delivering an Allen Charge).
60. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that an instruction that strays
from ABA model language and given after a jury has started deliberation will face higher
scrutiny upon appeal); see also Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000) (ruling that the coerciveness of a given charge can be determined based on the specific
language used during delivery).
61. State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 285-86 (Kan. 1994) (finding that it is less
prejudicial to deliver an Allen Charge prior to deliberations).
62. Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14, 21-22 (Wyo. 1969) (instructing that an Allen Charge
should not be given after jury deliberations begin and that a repeated charge should be read
alongside all other relevant jury instructions); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
INSTRUCTION]; cf. Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d 412, 415-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may not repeat an Allen Charge more
than once).
63. Norquay, 2011 MT 34 at ¶¶ 38-42.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 827 (Del. 1994); see also People v. Saltray, 969
P.2d 729, 733 (Colo. App. 1998) (ruling that presiding judges in Colorado may not directly
inquire about the numerical split of a hung jury).
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without prompt.67 Many jurisdictions have also limited the
language that a presiding judge uses when issuing an Allen
Charge.68 Any charge that uses different language than an
approved example—or simply uses language that is widely
accepted as unduly coercive—faces higher scrutiny and is at a
higher risk of being overturned.69
The final criticisms levied seek to restrict when a presiding
judge can issue an Allen Charge. Many jurisdictions state a
preference for the presentation of an Allen Charge in the predeliberation period.70 These jurisdictions require (or strongly
recommend) presiding judges to issue the charge alongside all
other jury instructions.71 In doing so, it is thought that the
coercive language of the Allen Charge is lessened due to it not
being singled out.72 This further lessens the impact of the charge
on individual jurors since clear groupings of the majority and
minority are not yet set. However, if a jurisdiction chooses to
allow for the reissuance of the charge, it often limits the number
of times a presiding judge may do so.73 A totality of the
circumstances test is often implemented to determine whether the
choice to repeat the given charge is unduly coercive in a given
case.74

67. Desmond, 654 A.2d at 827.
68. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that an instruction that strays
from ABA model language and given after a jury has initiated deliberations will face higher
scrutiny upon appeal).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994).
71. Id.; see also Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14, 22 (Wyo. 1969).
72. See Whitaker, 872 P.2d at 286; Elmer, 463 P.2d at 22.
73. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, § 15-5.4; see also Almeida v. State,
157 So. 3d 412, 415-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida
state courts may not repeat an Allen Charge more than once).
74. See State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I. 1981) (ruling that a presiding judge
must consider case-specific circumstances when considering whether to issue an Allen-type
instruction); see also Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting
Miller v. State, 645 So. 2d 363, 366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)) (stating that the “whole context”
of a given case must be used to determine the coerciveness of a given charge).
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III. ALLEN CHARGE PRACTICES IN THE FIFTY
STATES
Justice consists not in being neutral between right and
wrong, but in finding out the right and upholding it, wherever
found, against the wrong.75
Whether or not one agrees or disagrees with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Allen, ignoring that the ruling has resulted in a
mosaic of case law and statutes across the state judicial systems
promotes the unequal treatment of criminal defendants
nationwide.
This outcome undermines the necessity for
uniformity for legal concepts and practices of this caliber.
Unfortunately, the simple solution of an outright ban of Allentype charges does not provide the necessary solution to the
coercive question. The Allen Charge has proven to be a hydra; a
killing blow may seemingly be struck, but new Allen-type charges
rise in its place. Instead—if the Allen Charge is to be effectively
implemented—the proposed Post-Millennium Allen Charge must
limit the specific weaknesses of the base charge. The following
analysis does not seek to outline the Allen Charge practices of
every state to the fullest extent but rather classifies states based
on (1) their historical treatment of the Allen Charge and (2)
specific features in a state’s practice that address the concerns
discussed in Section II.B. of this Comment. The broad subcategories explored are: (A) the outliers; (B) states that have
adopted the ABA model instruction; (C) states that have
implemented Allen Charge bans; and (D) those states that still
allow the use of the Allen Charge.
A. The Outliers
An appropriate place to begin our examination of the Allen
Charge is by examining those states that have never taken part in
the Allen Charge debate. These outliers, Massachusetts and
Connecticut, have implemented Allen-type charges, but have

75. QUOTATIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 30 (2004).
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done so outside the parameters of the Allen decision.76 In doing
so, they have avoided the last century of national debate and
instead nurtured the growth of their own Allen-type charges
within the boundaries of their states. Understanding the outcomes
of these debates will set the stage for what to expect as the
practices of various Allen Charge jurisdictions are later discussed.
The following discussion centers on the (1) Tuey Charge of
Massachusetts and (2) the Chip Smith Charge of Connecticut.
1. Massachusetts
The first state in the spotlight is Massachusetts. Instead of
adopting the Allen Charge, the state adopted the guidelines of
Allen’s predecessor, Tuey.77 The Tuey Charge, now known as the
Tuey-Rodriquez Charge, is still an accepted practice in
Massachusetts but has seen limited use.78 However, in recent
decades the Judiciary of Massachusetts has imposed a series of
limitations on the charge that seeks to limit the probability of
undue coercive acts. Notably, a Tuey Charge in Massachusetts
may no longer use language that places undue pressure on the
minority of the jury.79 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts recognized this weakness in Commonwealth v.
Rodriquez and chose to end the practice affirmatively.80 In its
decision, the court corrected the model jury instruction by
removing any mention of the minority versus majority distinction
and changed the wording to emphasize that all parties within the
jury are to reconsider whether their views are reconcilable with
those on the opposing side.81

76. Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 2-3 (1851) (establishing the practice
of the “Tuey Charge” as the appropriate jury instruction to give to deadlocked juries in
Massachusetts); see also State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 386 (1881) (creating the Chip Smith
charge).
77. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 2-3. See generally EDWARD M. SWARTZ, TRIAL
HANDBOOK FOR MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS § 35:9 (3d ed. 2020).
78. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 2-3; see also Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d
192, 200-03 (Mass. 1973) (controlling case that served as catalyst of revision of Tuey Charge
practices).
79. See Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d at 201, 203.
80. Id. at 201-03.
81. Id. at 203.
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The court in Rodriquez also chose to limit the ability of
judges to give a Tuey Charge that states, “the case must at some
time be decided.”82 This stricken-out language unduly stated that
the jury had to reach a unanimous verdict.83 Simply put, whether
it be a conviction or acquittal, it is improper to state that a decision
is required. In its dismissal of this language, the court decries any
slight material change to an instruction that has a coercive
effect.84 Any instructions that reference the monetary or time cost
of the ongoing proceedings—or future proceedings—are also
unduly coercive.85
The Supreme Judicial Court has addressed limitations on
how the charge is presented as well. In Commonwealth v. Rollins,
the court banned the use of the charge in an indiscriminate or
premature manner.86 However, a presiding judge has the
discretion to give a Tuey Charge based on the length of
deliberations and the overall complexity of the given case.87
What is not in the presiding judge’s discretion, however, is the
language of the charge.88 When a judge announces a Tuey
Charge, the charge is read in its entirety, and the judge cannot
stray from the approved language.89 A presiding judge who strays
from the approved language jeopardizes the efforts of the higher
courts to limit the coercive effects of the charge, and thus, the
presiding judge’s actions are found to be unduly coercive.90
The Tuey Charge has been thoroughly vetted by the
Massachusetts courts. In doing so, the Tuey Charge has become
a model of what a limited Allen-type charge should strive to
achieve. The specific areas that the courts have addressed are the
same areas that the Post-Millennium Allen Charge must limit if it
hopes to overcome the inherently coercive nature of the Allen
Charge.
82. Id. at 201 (quoting Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 1) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
83. Id. at 200-01.
84. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d at 202.
85. Commonwealth v. Brown, 323 N.E.2d 902, 906, 907 (Mass. 1975).
86. 241 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Mass. 1968).
87. Commonwealth v. Haley, 604 N.E.2d 682, 688 (Mass. 1992).
88. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 839 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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2. Connecticut
The second outlier to discuss is Connecticut. Like the Tuey
Charge of Massachusetts, the Chip Smith Charge of Connecticut
predates the Allen Charge.91 The Chip Smith Charge derives its
name from the 1881 case State v. Smith.92 In what proves to be a
long list of arguments upon appeal, the creation of the Chip Smith
Charge comes in a single paragraph.93 In its conclusion of issue
eleven brought forth by Smith, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut alluded to the Tuey decision in concluding that it is
proper for a presiding judge to give an instruction that urges jurors
in the minority to reconsider their position.94 In a divergence
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has instead chosen to uphold a number of
the coercive aspects of the Chip Smith Charge.95
Unlike its relative in Massachusetts, the Chip Smith
Charge’s adopted language allows presiding judges to place
pressure on “dissenting jurors” to consider if their votes are
reasonable.96 The Supreme Court of Connecticut argues that the
use of “balancing language” counteracts the coercive effects of
singling out dissenting jurors.97 This “balancing language”
instructs jurors to “express [their] own conclusion[s]” and that it
is improper for them to “merely . . . acquiesc[e] in the
conclusion[s] of [their] fellow jurors.”98 The court confidently
states that, even if the language directed at the minority is
improper, the balancing language nullifies this effect.99 This line
of argument is prevalent in many jurisdictions that have done little
to limit the Allen Charge’s coercive nature.100
In State v. Feliciano, the court allows the reading of the Chip
Smith Charge multiple times.101 The state courts of Connecticut
91. See State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 381, 386 (1881).
92. Id. at 381.
93. Id. at 386.
94. Id.
95. State v. O’Neil, 207 A.2d 730, 746 (Conn. 2002).
96. Id. at 745-46.
97. Id. at 746.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., State v. McArthur, 899 A.2d 691, 706-07 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
101. 778 A.2d 812, 821 (Conn. 2001).
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argue that if a presiding judge appropriately issues a charge the
first time, there is no fault with the same instruction being
repeated multiple times.102 Comments by presiding judges that
place pressure on jurors to reach a conclusive decision have also
been approved.103 While Connecticut courts discourage the
mention of the costs associated with a mistrial, they have affirmed
the use of such instructions upon appeal.104 To support these
rulings, they state that the potential coercive effects of the
additional language are nullified if the presiding judge accurately
states the commonly accepted language of the Chip Smith
Charge.105
The Chip Smith Charge practice in Connecticut is exactly
what the Post-Millennium Allen Charge seeks to overcome.
Essentially, presiding judges are given free rein to use the charge
at their discretion. This practice inappropriately increases the
threat of an unduly coercive act of a presiding judge. For the PostMillennium Allen Charge to be successful, it must not mirror the
mistakes of the Chip Smith Charge.
B. American Bar Association Recommended Instruction
Decades after the first approval of the Allen Charge, the
ABA created a model Allen-type instruction that addressed the
rampant coercive issues relating to the charge.106 The creation of
the ABA model instruction served as a hopeful counter against
the wild landscape of Allen Charge practices in state courts. This
model Allen Charge was carried into the twenty-first century
within Section 15-5.4 of the Trial by Jury Standards.107 Section
15-5.4’s model instruction states that:
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give
an instruction which informs the jury:

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
McArthur, 899 A.2d at 705-07.
Id. at 706, 708.
Id. at 707.
AM. BAR ASS’N: ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CRIM. TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968).
107. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, § 15-5.4.
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(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be
done without violence to individual judgment;
(3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or herself
but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
the other jurors;
(4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and change an
opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous; and
(5) that no juror should surrender his or her honest belief as
to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as
provided in section (a). The court should not require or
threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable
length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon
a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability
of agreement.108

As seen in the model language above, the ABA’s greatest
concern regarding Allen Charges seems to be the abuse of the
minority.109 Specifically, sections 5.4(a)(3)-(5) outline the duty
of the jurors to balance the need for independent conclusions with
the necessary considerations of the views of their fellow jurors.110
This approach to handling the minority issue reflects the efforts
of Massachusetts to limit the coercive effort of the Tuey
Charge.111 If one desires to take pressure off those in the
minority, the simple solution seems to be to limit the mention of
any party within given instructions. The model ABA instruction
also addresses the issues of giving an Allen Charge multiple times
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 15-5.4(a)(3)-(5).
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d 192, 201 (Mass. 1973).
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to the same jury.112 Section 5.4(b) allows for a presiding judge to
repeat the charge multiple times if he or she deems it necessary.113
However, Section 5.4(b) limits the use of repeat charges that
threaten a jury into reaching a unanimous verdict or force
deliberations to extend for an unreasonable amount of time.114
The ABA model Allen Charge provides a necessary and
strong foundation for the Post-Millennium Allen Charge.
However, as is the case with many recommended practices, the
ABA model instruction’s effectiveness is limited by the number
of states that adopt it. Studying the states that have adopted the
ABA model instruction provides information on the strengths and
weaknesses of this category of charges. In the following
discussion, the focus will shift to states that have (1) adopted the
ABA model instruction; (2) co-opted language from the ABA
model; or (3) performed a “soft adoption” of the ABA model
instruction.
1. Adopted ABA Model Instruction
Very few states have adopted the ABA model instruction in
its entirety. The only states to have fully adopted the use of the
ABA instruction thus far are (1) Illinois; (2) Maine; (3)
Minnesota; (4) Vermont; (5) Tennessee; (6) New Jersey; and (7)
Michigan.115 While the ABA model instruction requires finetuning, the Supreme Court of Illinois describes the model
instruction as being the current best option to “resolve the many
questions created by the uncertainty . . . [of] instructing a jury that
is in disagreement.”116 In its adoption of the ABA model
instruction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine decried the use
of any Allen Charge or any modified charge that achieved the
same purpose.117 This adoption of the ABA instruction is less of
an acknowledgment of the strength of the ABA recommendations
and is more likely a preventive action to avoid future abuse of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, § 15-5.4(b).
Id.
Id.
See infra Appendix II.A.
People v. Prim, 298 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ill. 1972).
State v. White, 285 A.2d 832, 838 (Me. 1972).
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Allen Charges.118 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine seems
more inclined to an outright ban of the use of Allen-type charges
and adopted the ABA standards as a stepping stone towards this
goal.119 This distinction of a preference for the outright
elimination of Allen-type charges brings a thought-provoking
debacle to the surface. Despite their seemingly best efforts, states
that have banned the use of Allen Charges have simply replaced
the charge with a pseudo-Allen Charge that carries with it the
same potential for coercion.120 As discovered by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, the best option to overcoming the
challenges posed by Allen is to choose the least threatening
option.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota gave a resounding rebuttal
of the use of the Allen Charge in State v. Martin.121 In its ruling,
the court outlined the specific coercive features of the Allen
Charge that are overcome by the ABA model instruction.122 Like
the courts in Massachusetts, the feature of the Allen Charge that
the Supreme Court of Minnesota found to be the most egregious
was the undue pressure that it placed on the minority.123 The
egregiousness of this aspect of the instruction intensified upon
consideration that the base Allen Charge seemingly takes the side
of the majority.124 Further, the court found error in the practice
of instructing juries that “a case must at some time be decided.”125
To end its blitz of the Allen Charge, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota rebuked the common argument of judicial economy.126
The court found that “[h]ung juries are not a serious problem in
. . . criminal cases” and that allowing coercive instructions to
overcome such a trivial problem is “too dear a price to pay for
relieving court congestion.”127 In this final refutation, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota cemented the death of the Allen
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See id.
See infra Appendix III.B.
See 211 N.W.2d 765, 765, 769-71 (Minn. 1973).
See generally id.
Id. at 771.
See id.
Id. at 769.
Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
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Charge in the state and provided a key counterargument to Allen
Charge dissenters.
In State v. Perry, the Supreme Court of Vermont made the
final determination to remove the base Allen Charge from regular
use and instead chose to use the ABA model instruction as its new
standard moving forward.128 In its argument, the court cited the
commonly referenced issue regarding the unequal pressure placed
on those jurors in the minority.129 The court’s condemnation of
the charge mirrored the arguments of the presiding courts in
Maine and Minnesota. However, the Supreme Court of Vermont
provided insight into another potential issue: that the burden of
proof can shift during jury deliberations after the issuance of an
Allen Charge.130 Criminal trials mandate that the prosecution has
the burden of proof during proceedings.131 The Perry court
implied that the jurors take on the responsibility of the
prosecution upon the commission of a non-facially neutral Allen
Charge.132 Tennessee followed suit in 1975 in Kersey v. State.133
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Tennessee recognized that
the Allen Charge unduly pressured the minority to abandon its
view and give in to those of the majority.134
In its decision in State v. Czachor, the New Jersey Supreme
Court banned the use of the conventional Allen Charge and
endorsed the use of the ABA model instruction.135 Similarly,
Michigan banned the use of conventional Allen Charges in
1974.136 Both states’ supreme courts referenced rulings in other
states and in federal appellate courts that banned the use, or
repeated use, of the Allen Charge as they made their rulings.137
While their reasonings for abandoning the base Allen Charge
reflect the arguments offered in other jurisdictions, the examples

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See 306 A.2d 110, 112 (Vt. 1973).
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
525 S.W.2d 139, 144 (Tenn. 1975).
Id.
413 A.2d 593, 600 (N.J. 1980).
People v. Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d 441, 450 (Mich. 1974).
See Czachor, 413 A.2d at 599-600; see also Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d at 447, 449.
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they provide are used for a greater purpose.138 These debates
offer insight into the implementation of the Post-Millennium
Allen Charge on the national scale. Simply put, a revisionary
wave is required. As an increasing number of jurisdictions adopt
the use of the new model instruction, jurisdictions that have not
done so face mounting pressure to consider adoption as well.
Winning victories state by state in the drive to implement the
Post-Millennium Allen Charge builds the force required to break
through the most draconian of Allen Charge jurisdictions.
2. Co-opted ABA Language
The second classification to discuss is those states that have
never adopted the use of the ABA model instruction but have
instead co-opted its language. These states have approved new
instructions that rely on guidelines included in the ABA model
instruction. Co-opted instructions based on the ABA model
instruction are used in (1) Colorado and (2) North Carolina.139
The Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court released a
directive on September 22, 1971, that outlines the use of a new
series of model charges.140 This directive forbids the use of the
Allen Charge and instead inserts new guidelines that mirror the
ABA model instruction.141 However, the Colorado courts have
refined these guidelines in a series of cases since the 1970s.142
Specifically, presiding judges should not abuse their discretion by
giving an Allen-type instruction if there are clear signs that the
jurors are past the point of being able to agree.143 When deciding
whether it is appropriate to give an additional jury instruction,
presiding judges should consider the length of the deliberations
prior to the return of a split verdict.144 Further, a presiding judge
should make an inquiry to determine whether the jurors believe
that there still exists a “likelihood of [achieving] a unanimous
138. See Czachor, 413 A.2d at 599-600; see also Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d at 447-50.
139. See infra Appendix II.B.
140. People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1012 (Colo. 1984).
141. Id.; cf. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62.
142. See People v. Gonzales, 565 P.2d 945, 947 (Colo. App. 1977); see also People v.
Saltray, 969 P.2d 729, 732-33 (Colo. App. 1998).
143. Schwartz, 678 P.2d at 1012.
144. Id. at 1011; see also Gonzales, 565 P.2d at 947.
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verdict.”145 However, this inquiry is limited to the jurors’
opinions of potential agreement and cannot seek the numerical
split of the minority and majority.146 North Carolina has also
codified a modified Allen Charge that relies heavily on the
language of the ABA model instruction.147 The Criminal Code
Commission of North Carolina describes the language of its new
charge as the “‘weak’ charge set out in [ABA] Standards.”148 An
interesting feature included in North Carolina is that presiding
judges are instructed to state to the jury that they do not favor a
specific ruling in a given case.149 Having language that reaffirms
the presiding judge’s effective neutrality in the given case makes
it clear to judges and jurors alike that a given instruction is not an
endorsement of any one verdict.
The additional features present in the model instructions of
Colorado and North Carolina expose weaknesses present in the
ABA model instruction. While the ABA model instruction
provides clear guidelines of what a presiding judge may express
to the jury in an instruction, it leaves questions of how to do so
effectively from a procedural standpoint. Further, the type of
language included in North Carolina reaffirms the judiciary’s
drive for complete neutrality. For the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge to be effective, it must include clear guidelines that
address these common conflicts.
3. Soft Adoption of ABA Standards
The final sub-category of the states that have recognized the
ABA model instruction is those that performed a “soft adoption”
of the standards.150 Soft adoptions of the ABA standards offer
scant recommendations for the body of the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge but instead provide examples of how to achieve
implementation on a national scale. The “revisionary wave”
addressed in earlier discussion is not a process that happens
145. Saltray, 969 P.2d at 733.
146. Id.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1235 (2021).
148. § 15A-1235 cmt. (Criminal Code Commission 1977).
149. State v. Alston, 243 S.E.2d 354, 364 (N.C. 1978).
150. “Soft adoption” is a term of art created by the author for the purposes of this
Comment.
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quickly. To ensure the full implementation of the PostMillennium Allen Charge, soft adoptions offer a compelling
strategy. States are more likely to accept the new model
instruction if they can see the success it brings in neighboring
jurisdictions.151 While the need for change is urgent, it is more
important to ensure the effective implementation of the new
instruction rather than provide a hurried relief effort. The states
that have conducted soft adoptions are (1) Oregon; (2) Alaska; (3)
New Hampshire; (4) North Dakota; (5) Maryland; (6) Nebraska;
and (7) Rhode Island.152 These states support using the ABA
model instruction, but do not enforce its use and allow for other
Allen-type charges to be used on a case-by-case basis.
Oregon offers a simple example of the “soft adoption”
approach. In its opinion in State v. Marsh, the Supreme Court of
Oregon “disapproved the future use” of any supplemental Allentype charge, but recommended the use of the ABA model
instruction when necessary, moving forward.153 This is a theme
that occurs time and time again. The ABA model instruction
receives approval not only for its substance but also because it is
the least harmful alternative. As expressed by the court in Marsh,
the ABA instruction is recommended but is “not to be regarded
as ‘graven in stone.’”154
The ruling of the Alaskan Supreme Court in Fields v. State
recommends that judges refer to the ABA model instruction for
future use.155 It does not mandate the use of the ABA model
instruction but instead offers guidance by stating that those judges
who follow the model instruction are effectively minimizing the
coercive nature of the Allen Charge.156 The Supreme Courts of
New Hampshire and North Dakota have followed suit.157 In its
ruling in State v. Blake, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
151. See Gérard Roland, Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and SlowMoving Institutions, 38 STUD. IN COMPAR. INT’L DEV. 109, 126 (Winter 2004) (discussing
the importance of gradualism within the context of institutional reform).
152. See infra Appendix II.C.
153. 490 P.2d 491, 503 (Or. 1971).
154. Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
155. 487 P.2d 831, 840-43 (Alaska 1971).
156. Id. at 842.
157. See State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1973); see also State v. Champagne,
198 N.W.2d 218, 238-39 (N.D. 1972).
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recommended that presiding judges make use of “more
circumscribed instructions recommended in the ABA
Standards.”158 However, the opinion does not provide additional
commentary, as seen in the Alaskan ruling.159
In its
recommendation of the ABA model instruction, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota focuses specifically on the model
instruction’s emphasis on limiting minority coercion and limiting
the time frame for issuing the instruction.160
In its ruling in Kelly v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated that the use of the ABA model instruction will always be
proper, but other instructions may also be used.161 Further,
presiding judges may personalize a given charge if they issue one
prior to the deliberation period.162 A similar practice has been
adopted in Nebraska. The Nebraskan Supreme Court in State v.
Garza acknowledged that presiding judges may use the ABA
model instruction, but the use of the instruction is heavily
scrutinized with a preference towards no charge whatsoever.163
Rhode Island has also taken a unique approach to the soft
adoption theory. After recommending the use of the ABA model
instruction, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island admitted that it
would not heavily enforce the use of the instruction.164 Instead,
it recognized that “[i]n Rhode Island [it is not] require[d] that a
trial justice read a patterned instruction.”165 In the place of a strict
enforcement protocol, the court established a totality of the
circumstances test.166 For any future Allen-type charge, Rhode
Island courts would determine the validity of a given charge based

158. 305 A.2d at 306.
159. Compare id., with Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 840-43 (Alaska 1971).
160. Champagne, 198 N.W.2d at 238-39.
161. 310 A.2d 538, 541 (Md. 1973).
162. Id. at 542.
163. 176 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Neb. 1970); see also Potard v. State, 299 N.W. 362, 36465 (Neb. 1941) (ruling that the only purpose of using an Allen-type instruction was to
“encourage or coerce the jury”).
164. State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 322-23 (R.I. 1973) (recommending the use of
ABA model instructions in future trials); see also State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 899-901
(R.I. 1981).
165. Souza, 425 A.2d at 900.
166. Id.
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on the circumstances of the case and the specific language of the
given instruction.167
C. Strong Disapproval of Allen Charges
One of the largest categorizations of states is those that have,
in theory, implemented a near-complete ban of Allen Charges.
The states that have done so are (1) Arizona; (2) California; (3)
Hawaii; (4) Idaho; (5) Indiana; (6) Kentucky; (7) Louisiana; (8)
New Mexico; (9) Ohio; (10) South Dakota; (11) Tennessee; and
(12) Washington.168 Despite what first assumptions imply, the
majority of these states have only banned the use of the charge as
outlined in Allen. The following discussion will focus on how
states have implemented either (1) a total ban of the Allen Charge;
or (2) modified instructions.
1. Total Ban
An intriguing sub-category to analyze first are those states
that have implemented a total ban of any type of Allen Charge.
The states included in this sub-category are (1) Louisiana; (2)
South Dakota; (3) Arizona; (4) Hawaii; and (5) Idaho.169 Of these
states, Louisiana offers the clearest ruling regarding the Allen
Charge. Louisiana bans the use of both the base Allen Charge and
any Allen-type variations.170 This ban applies to any acts by
presiding judges that have a coercive effect, and any violation of
this ban is met with heavy scrutiny.171 This total ban is also in
place in South Dakota.172
Arizona initially implemented a ban on the Allen Charge in
State v. Thomas.173 In its decision, the court struck down the
“Voeckell [Charge].”174 The Supreme Court of Arizona found
167. Id.
168. See infra Appendix III.
169. See infra Appendix III.A.
170. State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 639, 641 (La. 1975).
171. Id. at 641-43.
172. State v. Fool Bull, 2009 SD 36, 766 N.W.2d 159, 170 (indicating ban of Allen
Charge in criminal cases).
173. 342 P.2d 197, 200 (Ariz. 1959).
174. Id.
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that this charge mirrored the language of the base Allen Charge
and unduly: (1) placed pressure on jurors in the minority; and (2)
implicitly implied that a hung jury is a waste of state resources.175
The Arizona court later reaffirmed this ban of Allen-type charges
in State v. Smith.176 The court found that any form of an Allen
Charge contained “potentially objectionable material” and that
any future use of the charge would be grounds for appeal in future
matters.177 Agreeing with the Arizona Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii barred future use of Allen-type
instructions.178 In its decision to ban the use of the charge, the
court found that the use of Allen Charges is detrimental to the
pursuit of equal justice since the “evils [of the Allen Charge] far
outweigh the benefits . . . .”179
Idaho provides a clear example of how a total ban on Allen
Charges has been implemented. Following its ruling in State v.
Flint, the Idaho Supreme Court barred any future form of the
“dynamite instruction.”180 It took this ruling one step further
when it provided a new practice for presiding judges to follow.181
Instead of forcing jurors back into deliberation through the use of
an Allen Charge, presiding judges are to take polls of split
juries.182 If the polling indicates that jurors still believed that they
are capable of reaching an agreement, then they will enter back
into deliberation.183 The choice to provide this alternative
practice is interesting in light of how other states have chosen to
direct presiding judges during the deliberation period. Diverging
from the customary course of action, the Idaho Supreme Court
instructs presiding judges on what they may do instead of limiting
what they may not do. A beneficial limiting factor to
acknowledge is that presiding judges may not reference the

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
493 P.2d 904, 907 (Ariz. 1972).
Id.
State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20, 25 (Haw. 1985).
Id. (quoting State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (Ariz. 1959)).
761 P.2d 1158, 1162-65 (Idaho 1988).
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id.
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necessity of the “efficient administration of criminal justice.”184
This practice coincides with the Minnesota judiciary’s decision to
adopt the ABA model instruction.185 The decisions of these
courts directly attack what is likely the strongest argument in
favor of the Allen Charge—judicial economy.
2. Modified Instructions
The following states have banned the use of the base Allen
Charge but still allow the use of modified instructions: (1)
California; (2) New Mexico; (3) Indiana; (4) Mississippi; (5)
Ohio; (6) Montana; (7) Wisconsin; (8) Kentucky; and (9)
Washington.186 States that have chosen to introduce modified
instructions have either created new Allen-type charges
themselves or have modified the original charge.
California originally banned the use of any Allen Charge in
1977.187 In the Supreme Court of California’s decision, it cited
the coercive practice of placing undue pressure on the minority.188
However, this ruling was overturned in 2012.189 Following the
decision in People v. Valdez, courts in California now give Allentype instructions if the instructions equally encourage the
majority and minority to reconsider their views.190 The Court of
Appeals of Indiana and the Supreme Court of Ohio have reached
similar conclusions.191 Allen Charges face careful scrutiny in
Indiana.192 The language of a given Allen Charge must strive to
remain neutral, and a second reading of the charge must be
accompanied by all other instructions that are given before

184. State v. Martinez, 832 P.2d 331, 335 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); D. CRAIG LEWIS,
IDAHO TRIAL HANDBOOK § 30:23 (2d ed. 2020).
185. Martinez, 832 P.2d at 335; cf. State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 771-73 (Minn.
1973).
186. See infra Appendix III.B.
187. People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1003-06 (Cal. 1977).
188. Id. at 1005.
189. People v. Valdez, 281 P.3d 924, 984-85 (Cal. 2012).
190. Id.
191. See Fultz v. State, 473 N.E.2d 624, 629-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Lewis v.
State, 424 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind. 1981)); State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d 188, 194-95 (Ohio
1989) (describing the Ohio courts use of a neutrally structured Allen Charge).
192. Clark v. State, 597 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
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deliberations begin.193 This theme of neutrality continues in
Mississippi’s model charge. There, the shortened charge that
survived the state court’s ban on Allen Charges instructs all jurors
to equally weigh the evidence before them and the arguments of
their peers.194
The Supreme Courts of Montana and Wisconsin refined their
model Allen Charge instructions for similar reasons. Both state
courts took issue specifically with the lack of neutrality regarding
how presiding judges address the jurors.195 However, a unique
feature that the Montana Supreme Court chose to focus on is what
is referred to as “final test” language.196 This “final test” language
mandates that jurors “make a determination of guilt or innocence
. . . .”197 The court found that this language misrepresents the law
and places undue pressure on the jurors.198 Kentucky’s model
Allen Charge follows a similar practice. Presiding judges cannot
give an instruction that explains the “desirability of reaching a
verdict.”199 Further, presiding judges cannot poll the jury prior to
the return of a verdict.200 Matching the requirements outlined by
Kentucky, presiding judges in Washington cannot “instruct the
jury in such a way as to suggest the need for agreement, the
consequences of no agreement, or the length of time a jury will
be required to deliberate.”201
Finally, New Mexico offers a unique alternative. After
banning the use of the “shotgun [charge],” it instituted a three
factor test that determines whether a given instruction is
coercive.202 In the first step, the court determines whether the
presiding judge read “any additional instruction” to the jury.203
Next, the court determines whether the given instruction both
193. Fultz, 473 N.E.2d at 629-30.
194. MISS. R. CRIM. P. 23.4; see also Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss.
1976) (barring use of the base Allen Charge).
195. See State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, ¶¶ 29-33, 38-40, 42-43, 359 Mont. 257, 26469, 248 P.3d 817, 822-25; see also Quarles v. State, 233 N.W.2d 401, 402 (Wis. 1975).
196. Norquay, 2011 MT 34 at ¶¶ 29-33, 38-43.
197. Id. at ¶¶ 38-43.
198. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 38, 42-43.
199. KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.57(1).
200. KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.57(2).
201. WASH. SUP. COURT CRIM. R. 6.15(f)(2).
202. State v. Salas, 2017-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 24-25, 400 P.3d 251, 261.
203. Id.
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“failed to caution a jury not to surrender [its] honest convictions”
and whether the presiding judge “established time limits on
further deliberations . . . .”204 This is an interesting approach to
the alternative instruction theory. Instead of creating a strict
instruction, the courts have instead created a test to determine the
validity of any future instructions. While this practice is not used
in the Post-Millennium Allen Charge, it reflects the ever-present
threat of presiding judges going outside of accepted model
language. For the new model instruction to succeed, it must
address this threat directly.
The practices previously discussed address many of the
concerns outlined at the outset of this Comment. Once again, the
concern regarding undue pressure on the minority is at the
forefront. No matter how strictly a jurisdiction limits the use of
Allen-type charges, it will always agree that the minority party
issue must be addressed. This is a clear indicator that the
substantive language of the Post-Millennium Allen Charge must
also address this concern. Further steps taken by the states
previously discussed are also vital as the proposed instruction is
shaped. While many of these aspects may not find a home in the
body of the presented charge, they may still be implemented as
sub-elements that direct presiding judges as they issue the
instruction.
D. Allows Use of the Allen Charge
For every state that has implemented some form of ban on
the Allen Charge, another has upheld its use. However, these two
opposing groups often share similar sentiments and worries
regarding the Allen Charge’s potential coerciveness. As these
groups tackle the coercion issue, a variety of tactics have arisen.
To begin, the states that allow the use of the Allen Charge are (1)
Alabama; (2) Arkansas; (3) Delaware; (4) Florida; (5) Georgia;
(6) Kansas; (7) Missouri; (8) Nevada; (9) New York; (10)
Oklahoma; (11) South Carolina; (12) Texas; (13) Utah; (14)
Virginia; (15) West Virginia; and (16) Wyoming.205 The ensuing
204. Id.
205. See infra Appendix IV.
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discussion will focus on (1) states that have preserved the original
charge; and (2) states that allow the use of the Allen Charge but
have introduced some form of limiting factor.
1. Preserve Original Charge
The simplest sub-category to discuss is the states that have
not implemented any significant changes to their Allen Charge
practices. These states are (1) Arkansas; (2) Georgia; and (3)
Oklahoma.206 The Arkansas Supreme Court definitively upheld
the use of Allen Charges in its 1982 ruling Walker v. State.207 Its
dismissal of the appellant’s arguments against the use of the Allen
Charge indicates a clear dismissal of the critical coercive
arguments recognized by other states.208 Most notably, the court
allows a judge to describe the potential expenses related to the
current proceedings and any future trials on the same matter.209
Further, presiding judges who use differing language from the
recommended instruction face less scrutiny when compared to
judges in other jurisdictions.210 These judges are given free rein
to indicate that no future jurors are better suited to reach a
decision than the current jurors.211 The Arkansas Supreme Court
acknowledged that these practices allow a presiding judge to
misrepresent the regular proceedings of the judicial process.212
The court finalized its rebuttal of the appellant’s argument, stating
that “the statement itself does not encourage the jury to find the
accused guilty; therefore, [the] appellant cannot show any
resulting prejudice . . . .”213
The Georgia Supreme Court followed suit in its approval of
the Allen Charge. Falling in line with prior precedent, the court
decided that—despite the controversy—the Allen Charge’s base
language was not “extreme or improper” and thus preserved the
206. See infra Appendix IV.
207. 276 Ark. 434, 435-37, 637 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1982).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.; cf. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that any instruction
that strays from ABA model language will face higher scrutiny upon appeal).
211. Walker, 276 Ark. at 435-37, 637 S.W.2d at 529.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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charge for future use.214 The Oklahoma judiciary has approved
the use of Allen Charges in a similar fashion.215 In Miles v. State,
the Court of Criminal Appeals found that an Allen Charge is
proper if the jurors have been told “that they are not being forced
to agree . . . .”216 This language seems to indicate a preference for
subduing language relating to the minority or majority of the jury,
but in practice, this limitation has not been implemented.217 The
recommended supplemental Allen Charge instruction still
includes language that asks the minority to consider the
arguments and views of the majority.218 The use of the original
Allen Charge is still alive and well in Oklahoman and Georgian
courts.
These three jurisdictions provide a unique perspective in the
Allen Charge debate. Despite recognizing the potential coercive
harm of Allen Charges, Arkansas, Georgia, and Oklahoma have
decided that the potential benefits outweigh any danger to future
defendants.219
When addressing the advocacy of these
jurisdictions regarding the Allen Charge, the arguments seem to
rely solely on the ideal of judicial economy.220 Even if harm
occurs, if the courts are able to keep efficiently processing cases,
then that justifies the harm suffered. These actions accrue a
greater cost beyond harm suffered by individual defendants; it
erodes the reliability and faith in the judicial process. As
recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the actual process of
administering an Allen Charge requires a presiding judge to
misrepresent the judicial process.221 The costs associated with
this line of thinking are far too great.

214. Anderson v. State, 276 S.E.2d 603, 606-07 (Ga. 1981).
215. Miles v. State, 1979 OK CR 116, 602 P.2d 227, 228-29.
216. Id.
217. STEPHEN JONES ET AL., VERNON’S OKLAHOMA FORMS § 23.58 (2d ed. 2020).
218. Id. As of the August 2020 update.
219. Walker v. State, 276 Ark. 434, 435-37, 637 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1982); Anderson,
276 S.E.2d at 606-07; Miles, 602 P.2d at 228-29.
220. See Walker, 276 Ark. at 435-37, 637 S.W.2d at 529; Anderson, 276 S.E.2d at 60607; Miles, 602 P.2d at 228-29.
221. Walker, 276 Ark. at 435-37, 637 S.W.2d at 529.
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2. Implemented Limiting Factors
The second sub-category of approved Allen Charges
attempts to address the coercive nature of the charge. States have
taken various measures to limit the coercive effects of the Allen
Charge, including (a) limiting references to the minority; (b)
implementing a totality of the circumstances test; and (c) limiting
how an Allen Charge is presented.222 Many state jurisdictions
have implemented many of these measures.
a. Restrictions on Minority Pressure
As seen in the previous discussion of states that have adopted
the ABA model instruction and states that have implemented a
ban on Allen Charges, the most commonly referenced concern is
that the Allen Charge places undue pressure on the minority. With
this in mind, it is little surprise that even those states who wish to
retain the use of the Allen charge have shared this sentiment. The
states that have not banned the Allen Charge but have taken steps
to remedy the minority issue are: (1) Pennsylvania; (2) South
Carolina; (3) Virginia; (4) Iowa; (5) New York; (6) Nevada; and
(7) Florida.223 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania provides a
base understanding of the concerns in this category. Approaching
the issue from the perspective of criminal defendants, the court
found that calling for the minority to reconsider its view tips the
scale of justice by “impl[ying] that only those who entertain a
reasonable doubt as to guilt should reconsider.”224
The practices approved by the South Carolina judiciary
provide an interesting example of how a model instruction
addresses the minority issue. In South Carolina, not only is it
improper to emphasize the minority in a supplemental instruction,
but the guidelines provided by the South Carolina Supreme Court
mandate that a presiding judge address a jury with complete
neutrality.225 Language approved by the Virginian Supreme
Court bolsters this push for neutrality. In Poindexter v.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See infra Appendix IV.
See infra Appendix IV.
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 263 A.2d 923, 926 (Pa. 1970).
Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323-24 (S.C. 2002).
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Commonwealth, the court approved an Allen Charge that asked
jurors to consider the views of their peers but instructed that they
do not surrender any “conscientious opinion.”226 The model Allen
Charge in Iowa provides an extension of the language discussed
above. Neutrality remains the focus of the charge, but each juror
approaches the arguments of their fellow jurors with “a
disposition to be convinced . . . .”227 This principle achieves one
of the goals of the Post-Millennium Allen Charge. The immediate
goal of the new model instruction is to ensure the protection of
criminal defendants. By approaching the creation of the new
model instruction language with the goal of complete neutrality,
the minority coercion issue is directly attacked, thus eliminating
the most recognized threat of the base Allen Charge.
The state of New York also focused on the minority issue in
its modified Allen Charge.228 Specifically, the modifications have
been made to avoid attempts by a presiding judge to “shame the
jury into reaching [a] verdict . . . .”229 By banning the mention of
the minority in an Allen Charge, the New York judiciary is
recognizing that the minority faces attacks on multiple fronts.
Not only are jurors in the minority facing pressure from their
fellow jurors, but with the issuance of an improper Allen Charge,
they are being told by the presiding judge that they are a burden
on the judicial process.230 The Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling in
Azbill v. State supports the assertions made in New York.231
Recognizing that the use of an Allen Charge gives a presiding
judge the ability to interfere with the deliberation process, the
Nevada Supreme Court recommends that judges rarely use the
Allen Charge.232 However, the rare usage of the instruction must
not place any undue pressure on the minority, and the instruction
is faulty if it does not “remind . . . jurors . . . to surrender
conscientiously . . . .”233 Once again, like the practices seen in
226. 191 S.E.2d 200, 203 (Va. 1972).
227. State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Iowa 1980).
228. People v. Aponte, 759 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 495 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Nev. 1972).
232. Id.
233. Ransey v. State, 594 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Nev. 1979) (citing Redeford v. State, 572
P.2d 219, 220 (Nev. 1977)).
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South Carolina, the proper route to ensure jury independence is to
take each juror at face value and to express that each individual is
responsible for considering the views expressed by their peers.
Florida offers a unique instruction that serves as a final
example of the current measures taken to limit undue pressure on
the minority. Like the previously discussed states, the Florida
model instruction limits any language that refers to the minority
or majority and further limits the ability of a presiding judge to
re-issue a given charge.234 What it does offer is a roundtable type
of discussion.235 After the issuance of the charge, the jurors return
to the deliberation room and sequentially argue their views of the
case.236 During this time, the jurors are expected to acknowledge
the weaknesses in their arguments.237 After this “roundtable” has
concluded, if it seems that the jurors are still unwilling to concede,
they return to the judge with a final hung verdict.238 This
approach is an oddity in comparison to the practices of other states
but is not without its own merits. While this roundtable style of
discussion has not found a new home in the Post-Millennium
Allen Charge, the Florida judiciary should be commended for its
efforts to address the challenges of Allen-type charges.
b. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
Three states have concluded that the best manner to address
the Allen Charge is to review the merits of the given charge on a
case-by-case basis.239 In what is commonly referred to as a
“totality-of-the-circumstances test,” the states that follow this
practice judge the use of an Allen Charge within the parameters
of the case that is currently before the court.240 Instead of issuing
a blanket ban on the practice, these states have found it easier to
234. FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 4.1 (1981); see also Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d
412, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may
not repeat an Allen Charge more than once).
235. FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 4.1.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See infra Appendix IV.
240. “Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test” is a term of art used to collectively
reference certain state practices. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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address issues when they appear. The states that fall within this
sub-category are: (1) Alabama; (2) West Virginia; and (3)
Utah.241
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has simply
stated that the Allen Charge is permissible “if the language of the
charge is not coercive or threatening.”242 To determine whether
the language is improperly coercive, the court judges the given
charge based on the “whole context” of the given case.243 The
specific factors that the court considered in Maxwell v. State are
quite limited.244 It considered whether the presiding judge gave
an indication of how he believed the jury should decide the case
and if the specific language used was “coercive or threatening.”245
The West Virginian judiciary follows a similar practice, stating
that undue coercion is difficult to “determine[] by any general or
definite rule.”246 Instead, the courts have implemented a practice
of determining undue coercion on a case-by-case basis.247 In a
similar vein, the Court of Appeals of Utah has indicated that a
valid Allen Charge is still unduly coercive if the presiding judge
acts coercively.248 This practice of determining coerciveness
implements an environment of indecisiveness that will not aid the
new model instruction. Instead of relying on various judges’
interpretations of what constitutes coercive behavior, the model
instruction must provide clear guidelines that keep judges within
the allowed parameters. By setting a strict barrier for use,
defendants on appeal can effectively argue any undue coercive
acts of a presiding judge based on how far the judge strayed from
the guidelines of the Post-Millennium Allen Charge.

241. See infra Appendix IV.
242. Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting
Gwarjanski v. State, 700 So. 2d 357, 360 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)).
243. Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 645 So. 2d 363, 366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)).
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. STEPHEN P. MEYER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 37:19
(2021).
247. Id.; State v. Spence, 313 S.E.2d 461, 463 (W. Va. 1984).
248. See State v. Harry, 2008 UT App 224, ¶¶ 27, 33-34, 189 P.3d 98, 106-08.
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c. Presentation of the Allen Charge
The final sub-category of approved Allen Charge
jurisdictions are those states that limit how a presiding judge may
present an instruction.249 These guidelines limit the when and
how a presiding judge is to issue a charge, and further serve as
indicators to prove that the judge has acted in a coercive manner.
The states that have taken limiting measures are: (1) Delaware;
(2) Kansas; (3) Wyoming; (4) Texas; and (5) Missouri.250
In its steps to limit the coercive effects of the Allen Charge,
the Delaware judiciary recognizes that when a presiding judge
chooses to present an instruction is a determining factor when
deciding whether the judge acted coercively.251 Further, the
length of jury deliberations prior to and after the issuance of an
Allen Charge can reflect the coercive nature of an instruction.252
The Delaware Supreme Court elaborates further by stating that
the likelihood of coercion increases if the presiding judge knows
the numerical division of the jury.253 While it is a reversible error
for the judge to inquire about how the jury is split—if the jury
informs the judge without prompt—then giving an Allen Charge
is not automatically improper.254 This acknowledgment of the
potential issues arising out of the presiding judge’s knowledge of
the numerical split of the jury is a valuable feature. Implementing
such a feature into the Post-Millennium Allen Charge places a
strict barrier between the presiding judge and the jurors during
deliberation, thus ensuring that any intentional—or
unintentional—coercive acts do not occur.
The standards in Kansas and Wyoming further elaborate on
how the timing of an instruction aids in determining whether a
presiding judge acted coercively. In Kansas, presiding judges
deliver Allen Charges before the jurors begin deliberating.255
Further, it is improper for the presiding judge to emphasize the
249. See infra Appendix IV.
250. See infra Appendix IV.
251. Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826-27 (Del. 1994).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 827.
254. Id. at 827-28.
255. State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994); State v. Roadenbaugh, 673
P.2d 1166, 1174 (Kan. 1983).
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instruction as being of higher importance than any other
concurrent instructions.256 To accomplish this, the Allen Charge
is read alongside other jury instructions.257 The Wyoming
Supreme Court followed suit in its decision in Elmer v. State.258
After providing a harsh rebuke of the use of the charge, the court
recommended that the issuance of the charge occur during the
delivery of the other jury instructions.259 Straying from this
recommendation increases the likelihood that the presiding judge
has acted unduly coercively.260 Here, this practice limits the
potential for undue coerciveness in the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge. First, it limits the potential coercion of jurors in the
minority since the instructions are read prior to these parties being
formed. Further, by reading these instructions alongside the other
jury instructions present in a given case, some weight is taken off
the charge by making it seem no more important than any other
instruction. These are vital features in the newly proposed model
instruction.
The issue of timing also serves a beneficial purpose. A
balancing test allows for a court to understand whether it is
appropriate to give an Allen Charge or if the charge has coerced a
decision out of the jury.261 In Texas, presiding judges have the
discretion of determining whether the jury has deliberated for an
appropriate amount of time.262 The severity of the charges and
the overall complexity of the facts are used to determine whether
it is proper to issue a charge.263 For example, in Andrade v. State,
the court found that the presiding judge properly extended jury
deliberations given the complexity of the capital murder
charges.264 After receiving the instruction, the jury deliberated
for eight additional hours before reaching a unanimous verdict.265
Here, since the facts of the case were complex and the alleged
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Whitaker, 872 P.2d at 286.
Id.
463 P.2d 14, 22 (Wyo. 1969).
Id. at 21-22.
See id. at 23 (McIntyre, J., concurring).
See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Id.
See id.
700 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Id. at 588-89.
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crime was severe, the presented Allen Charge was not coercive.266
If the jurors had returned a verdict within a shorter time frame, it
is more likely that the given instruction coerced them to reach the
verdict.267 The use of the “hammer [charge]” in Missouri carries
similarities to the Texas balancing test process.268 Presiding
judges in Missouri are given broad discretion in determining if
their actions and the delivery of an Allen-type charge is
coercive.269 The balancing test weighs heavily in favor of
presiding judges.270
The balancing test described by the Texas and Missouri
courts aids the development of the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge. This test can be used to aid a presiding judge as he or she
determines whether to issue a subsequent reading of the new
instruction. Likewise, if the presiding judge’s decision to present
the instruction is appealed, the commentary aids the appellate
judge in determining if the presiding judge’s actions are unduly
coercive. Giving a presiding judge this discretion is certainly a
risk but it is a necessary feature to build a well-rounded
instruction.
IV. THE POST-MILLENNIUM ALLEN CHARGE
If we want our criminal justice system, and American society
at large, to operate on a higher ethical code, then we have to
model that code ourselves.271
The Post-Millennium Allen Charge does not seek to
empower a presiding judge but rather places barriers on judicial
discretion to protect the interest of defendants. This new model
instruction must address the concerns of the various state
judiciaries while simultaneously filling in the gaps of their current
practices. In its model language, the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge seeks to specifically address the issue of undue minority
266. Id.
267. Id.; Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
268. City of St. Charles v. Hal-Tuc, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
269. Id.; see also State v. Dewitt, 924 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
270. Hal-Tuc, Inc., 841 S.W.2d at 781-82; see also Dewitt, 924 S.W.2d at 570.
271. Barack Obama, How to Make this Moment the Turning Point for Real Change,
MEDIUM (June 1, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9Q2D-CQCD].
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coercion and the multiple issues related to the presentation of an
Allen-type charge. To accomplish this goal, the following
discussion contains both (A) the elements of the Post-Millennium
Allen Charge; and (B) notes of use to aid the implementation of
the model instruction.
A. Elements272
In issuing the given Post-Millennium Allen Charge, the
presiding judge must adhere to the guidance of the following
elements:
(A) Prior to the jury’s retirement for deliberation, the court
may present this instruction, informing jurors that:
(1) a unanimous verdict requires that all jurors have
independently reached the same conclusion;
(2) during deliberations, individual jurors should be
impartial to the facts of the case and should give weight to
the views and arguments of their fellow jurors;
(3) while it is the duty of every juror to reach an independent
conclusion of innocence or guilt, jurors should partake in a
thorough debate to ensure all aspects of the given case have
been explored; and
(4) no juror is to surrender an honest belief of guilt or
innocence based on threats or pressure of other jurors or
court officials, or out of interest of returning a unanimous
verdict.273
(B) The presiding judge may repeat the present charge a
single time after the jury informs the judge that they are
unable to reach a verdict.274

272. The following instructions were written by the author of this Comment for the
express purpose of proposing a new model Allen-type instruction.
273. The language of the presented charge is a modified version of the language in the
ABA model instruction. See ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, at § 15-5.4(a)(1)(5).
274. While multiple jurisdictions allow the re-issuance of a given charge multiple
times, the Post-Millennium Allen Charge follows the example and reasoning referenced by
the Florida state courts. See Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d 412, 415-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may not repeat an Allen Charge
more than once).
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(1) The presiding judge must repeat all necessary
instructions to fully explain the controlling statutory
language and duties of the jury; and275
(2) the presiding judge is to consider the length of
deliberations and the complexity of the given case in
deciding whether to repeat the given instruction.276
(3) The presiding judge may not inquire into the numerical
split of the jury when determining whether to re-issue the
language in Section (A)(1)-(4);277
(4) however, it is not improper for the presiding judge to
repeat the present charge if the judge gained knowledge of
the numerical split from an independent act of the jury.278
(C) It is improper for presiding judges to use any language
that strays from the requirements outlined in Section (A)(1)(4) of this charge.279
(D) Presiding judges are prohibited from referencing any
cost associated with the current matter before the court, or

275. This element adopts the reasoning presented by the Kansas state courts that
presenting a charge alongside other relevant instructions aids in combating the undue
coercive effects of the instruction. See State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994)
(finding that it is preferable to repeat an Allen Charge alongside all other instructions present
in the given case).
276. This element is reminiscent of the manner in which Allen Charges are determined
to be improperly coercive in Texas. See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (ruling that the context of the given case must be considered when determining
whether it was proper to issue an Allen Charge); see also Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d 585,
589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (declaring that the complexity of the given case and the severity
of the charges against the defendant are relevant factors when determining whether issuing
an Allen Charge was proper).
277. As seen in multiple jurisdictions, the inquiry into the numerical split of a hung
jury poses multiple threats of coercion. See Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 827 (Del.
1994) (ruling that the likelihood of coercion increases if a presiding judge seeks out the
numerical split of a jury before issuing an Allen Charge); see also People v. Saltray, 969 P.2d
729, 732-33 (Colo. App. 1998) (ruling that presiding judges in Colorado may not directly
inquire about the numerical split of a hung jury).
278. This element seeks to avoid unnecessarily limiting presiding judges from
presenting the model instruction when they do not improperly learn of the numerical split of
the jury. Desmond, 654 A.2d at 826-28 (ruling that a presiding judge is not limited from
issuing an Allen Charge if the jury informs him of its numerical split without prompt).
279. This element implements the standard set by the Maryland state courts in their
adoption of the original ABA model instruction. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md.
1973) (stating that any instruction that strays from ABA model language will face “careful”
scrutiny upon appeal).
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any other associated costs that may result from an
inconclusive verdict.280
(1) It is further unacceptable to state that it is improper for
an inconclusive verdict to be given.281

B. Notes of Use282
Dissecting the elements of this new model instruction
provides guidance on how this charge combats the coercive
nature of the base Allen Charge. Elements (A)(1)-(4) contain the
base language of the actual charge. This language is what the
presiding judge reads to the jurors prior to their retirement for
deliberations. The language contained within is a version of the
ABA model instruction that is refined by the lessons learned from
the studied state practices.283 Element (A)(1) provides a clear
definition of the duty of individual jurors. While jurors should
seek a unanimous verdict, their independence is of greater value
to the judicial process. Elements (A)(2)-(4) define what an
independent verdict means in the context of the current
proceedings and provides practical guidance on how the jurors
should conduct themselves in the deliberation room. A vital
feature of these sub-elements is the reference to individual jurors.
Banning the mention of either the majority or minority overcomes
the largest hurdle of this debate—the undue coercion of the
minority.284

280. As discussed by multiple jurisdictions, the discussion of any costs associated with
a proceeding only serve to unduly pressure a jury into reaching a verdict. See State v. Martin,
211 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Minn. 1973) (ruling that the coercive nature of informing jurors of
the costs of the ongoing proceedings does little to aid the interest of judicial economy).
281. This specific element seeks to combat the improper use of “final test” language.
See State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, ¶¶ 31, 37, 38-41, 43, 359 Mont. 257, 264-69, 248 P.3d
817, 822-25 (defining and barring use of “final test” language).
282. The following information provides guidelines on the use of the proposed PostMillennium Allen Charge.
283. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, at § 15-5.4(a)(1)-(5).
284. Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 (S.C. 2002) (explaining South Carolina’s ban
on any Allen-type instructions that mention either the minority or majority); see Smith &
Kassin, supra note 51, at 639-41 (finding that the minority faces greater pressure after the
issuance of an Allen Charge compared to the majority); see also Deadlocked Juries: Thomas,
supra note 50, at 375 (describing the threat an Allen Charge poses to an independent jury
ruling).
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Elements (B)-(D) define and limit the duties of the presiding
judge in his or her issuance of the charge. First, Element (B)
limits the number of times and the manner in which a presiding
judge can repeat the instruction to the jury. A presiding judge
risks coercing the jury into reaching an improper ruling if he or
she repeatedly insists that the jurors reenter deliberations.285 To
avoid this, the model instruction limits the ability of the presiding
judge to re-issue the charge to a single time. Further, Element
(B)(1) limits the potential for coercion by mandating that all
provided instructions be repeated alongside the model instruction.
This practice avoids singling out the model instruction in the eyes
of the jury.286 Element (B)(2) empowers the presiding judge to
determine whether issuing the charge a second time is necessary
by conducting a totality of the circumstances test. In conducting
this test, the presiding judge is to weigh the apparent complexity
of the given case with the conduct of the jury. For example, the
issuance of a second charge is likely proper if the jury deliberated
for a relatively short amount of time in a case with complex facts
or statutory requirements.287 This specific sub-element is the area
where coercive acts by the presiding judge offer the greatest
threat, thus the limitation of repeating the model instruction a
single time. Elements (B)(3)-(4) prevent presiding judges from
inquiring about the numerical split of a hung jury when deciding
whether to re-issue a second iteration of the language in Elements
(A)(1)-(4). However, to avoid unduly punishing a presiding
judge who took no improper actions, Element (B)(4) does not
prevent the judge from issuing a second charge if he or she gained

285. This practice has repeatedly been found to be unnecessary when weighed against
the possible coercive effects of a given charge. See Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d 412, 41516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may not
repeat an Allen Charge more than once).
286. See State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994) (finding that it is preferable
to repeat an Allen Charge alongside all other instructions present in the given case).
287. As discussed prior, this process is a modified version of the process established
in Texas state courts when determining if a given charge was coercive. See Montoya v.
State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (ruling that the context of the given case
must be considered when determining whether it was proper to issue an Allen Charge); see
also Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (declaring that the
complexity of the given case and the severity of the charges against the defendant are relevant
factors when determining whether issuing an Allen Charge was proper).
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knowledge of the numerical split from an independent act of the
jury.288
Elements (C)-(D) conclude the model instruction by further
limiting the presiding judge’s ability to coerce the jury into
reaching a desired conclusion. Specifically, these elements limit
a judge from straying from the stated language in Elements
(A)(1)-(4) and from referencing any associated costs with the
judicial process.289 First, Element (C) prevents a presiding judge
from unknowingly creating a secondary instruction that
improperly coerces a jury. Implementation of this element
provides jurisdictions greater control over the language used in
the listed instruction and provides a test for an appellate court to
judge the actions of the lower court.290 Element (D) recognizes
that the costs associated with trying a case can be unduly coercive
over a juror. Presiding judges cannot use the costs of the ongoing
proceedings and any future proceedings as a way to guilt the jury
into reaching a unanimous ruling. The costs of a trial are not the
concerns of the jury and should not distract it in its determination
of guilt.
V. CONCLUSION
After 125 years, it is time to put the Allen Charge debate to
rest. In a social climate focused on reform and guarantees of
equal justice, the legal community must examine the weaknesses
and areas of potential harm in the judicial process assiduously.
The Allen Charge is a relic of a bygone legal era that placed
judicial efficiency as the highest ideal. In considering the Allen
Charge’s role, it is clear it can serve a beneficial purpose if the
inherent coercive nature of the charge can be effectively
overcome. The Post-Millennium Allen Charge is a collective
piece that ties together the best practices of the fifty states and the
288. See Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826-28 (Del. 1994) (ruling that a presiding
judge is not limited from issuing an Allen Charge if the jury informs him or her of its
numerical split without prompt).
289. See State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Minn. 1973) (ruling that the coercive
nature of informing jurors of the costs of the ongoing proceedings does little to aid the
interest of judicial economy).
290. See Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that any instruction that
strays from ABA model language will face higher scrutiny upon appeal).
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ABA model instruction. Adopting such a charge takes a step
forward towards providing safeguards as criminal defendants
traverse the ever-changing legal realm.
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APPENDIX I: THE OUTLIERS291
State

Cited Materials

A. Tuey-Rodriquez Charge

Massachusetts

Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851);
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez,
300 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 323
N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Rollins,
241 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Haley, 604
N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 1992);
Commonwealth v. O’Brien,
839 N.E.2d 845 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2005).

B. Chip Smith Charge

Connecticut

State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376
(Conn. 1881); State v. O’Neil,
207 A.2d 730 (Conn. 2002);
State v. Feliciano, 778 A.2d
812 (Conn. 2001); State v.
Martinez, 378 A.2d 517
(Conn. 1977); State v.
McArthur, 899 A.2d 691
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006).

291. The following materials listed in Appendices I-IV are not the sole controlling
authorities in the listed jurisdictions—they are simply the materials that were referenced or
cited in the discussion above. While some sources listed in the appendices are not cited in
the body of this Comment, they are listed due to the aid they provided in preparing this
Comment.

4 EPPERSON.MAN.FIN..DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

154

4/13/22 10:00 AM

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 75:1

APPENDIX II: ABA MODEL INSTRUCTIONS
State

Cited Materials

A. Adopted ABA Model Instruction

Illinois

Maine

Michigan

Minnesota

New Jersey

Tennessee

People v. Prim, 298 N.E.2d
601 (Ill. 1972); People v.
Branch, 462 N.E.2d 868 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984); People v.
Brown, 362 N.E.2d 820 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977).
State v. White, 285 A.2d 832
(Me. 1972); State v. Cote, 507
A.2d 584 (Me. 1986); State v.
Kaler, 1997 ME 62, 691 A.2d
1226.
People v. Sullivan, 220
N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1974);
People v. Lawson, 223
N.W.2d 716 (Mich. Ct. App.
1974); People v. Thompson,
265 N.W.2d 632 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d
765 (Minn. 1973); State v.
Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.
2012); State v. Danforth, 573
N.W.2d 369 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
State v. Czachor, 413 A.2d
593 (N.J. 1980); State v.
Boiardo, 268 A.2d 55 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970);
State v. Ross, 93 A.3d 739
(N.J. 2014).
Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d
139 (Tenn. 1975).
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State v. Perry, 306 A.2d 110
(Vt. 1973); State v. Rolls,
2020 VT 18, 229 A.3d 695.

B. Co-opted ABA Language

Colorado

North Carolina

People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d
1000 (Colo. 1984); People v.
Gonzales, 565 P.2d 945 (Colo.
App. 1977); People v. Saltray,
969 P.2d 729 (Colo. App.
1998).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235
(1977); State v. Alston, 243
S.E.2d 354 (N.C. 1978); State
v. Blackwell, 747 S.E.2d 137
(N.C. Ct. App. 2013).

C. Soft Adoption of ABA Standards

Alaska

Maryland

Nebraska
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon

Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831
(Alaska 1971); Stapleton v.
State, 696 P.2d 180 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985).
Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538
(Md. 1973); Goodmuth v.
State, 490 A.2d 682 (Md.
1985); Hall v. State, 75 A.3d
1055 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2013).
State v. Garza, 176 N.W.2d
664 (Neb. 1970); Potard v.
State, 299 N.W. 362, 365
(Neb. 1941).
State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300
(N.H. 1973)
State v. Champagne, 198
N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1972).
State v. Marsh, 490 P.2d 491
(Or. 1971); State v. Garrett,
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426 P.3d 164 (Or. Ct. App.
2018); State v. Hutchison, 920
P.2d 1105 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d
300 (R.I. 1973); State v.
Souza, 425 A.2d 893 (R.I.
1981); State v. Luanglath, 863
A.2d 631 (R.I. 2005).

APPENDIX III: STRONG DISAPPROVAL
State

Cited Materials
A. Total Ban

Arizona

Hawaii
Idaho

Louisiana

South Dakota

State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197
(Ariz. 1959); State v. Smith,
493 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1972);
State v. Kuhs, 224 P.3d 192
(Ariz. 2010).
State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20
(Haw. 1985).
State v. Flint, 761 P.2d 1158
(Idaho
1988);
State
v.
Martinez, 832 P.2d 331 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d
639 (La. 1975); State v.
Bradley, 995 So. 2d 1230 (La.
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Caston,
561 So. 2d 941 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
State v. Fool Bull, 2009 SD 36,
766 N.W.2d 159; State v.
Ferguson, 175 N.W.2d 57 (S.D.
1970); State v. Hall, 272
N.W.2d 308 (S.D. 1978).
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B. Modified Instructions

California

Indiana

Kentucky

Montana

Mississippi

New Mexico

Ohio

People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997
(Cal. 1977); People v. Valdez,
281 P.3d 924 (Cal. 2012);
People v. Butler, 209 P.3d 596
(Cal. 2009).
Fultz v. State, 473 N.E.2d 624
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Lewis v.
State, 424 N.E.2d 107 (Ind.
1981); Clark v. State, 597
N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.57;
Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
943 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1997);
Gray v. Commonwealth, 480
S.W.3d 253 (Ky. 2016).
State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34,
359 Mont. 257, 248 P.3d 817;
State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054
(Mont. 1960); State v.
Santiago, 2018 MT 13, 390
Mont. 154, 415 P.3d 972.
Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d
591 (Miss. 1976); Bell v. State,
2015-KA-00643-SCT (Miss.
2016); Gearlson v. State, 482
So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1986).
State v. Salas, 2017-NMCA057, 400 P.3d 251; State v.
Laney, 81 P.3d 591 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2003); State v. Romero,
526 P.2d 816 (N.M. Ct. App.
1974) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d
188 (Ohio 1989); State v.
Maupin, 330 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio
1975); State v. May, 2015Ohio-4275, 49 N.E.3d 736.
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WASH. SUP. COURT CRIM. R.
6.15(2); State v. Parker, 485
P.2d 60 (Wash. 1971).
Quarles v. State, 233 N.W.2d
401 (Wis. 1975); Kelley v.
State, 187 N.W.2d 810 (Wis.
1971).

APPENDIX IV: ALLOWS USE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE
State

Cited Materials

A. Preserve Original Charge

Arkansas

Georgia

Oklahoma

Walker v. State, 276 Ark. 434,
637 S.W.2d 528 (1982);
Griffin v. State, 2 Ark. App.
145, 617 S.W.2d 21 (1981);
Moore v. State, 2015 Ark. App.
480, 469 S.W.3d 801.
Anderson v. State, 376 S.E.2d
603 (Ga. 1981); Anglin v.
State, 806 S.E.2d 573 (Ga.
2017); Barnes v. State, 266
S.E.2d 212 (Ga. 1980).
Miles v. State, 602 P.2d 227
(Okla. 1979).

B. Restrictions on Minority Pressure

Florida

FLORIDA STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTION § 4.1 (1981);
Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d
412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015);
Peak v. State, 363 So. 2d 1166
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997
(Fla. 2001).
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Iowa

Nevada

Pennsylvania

New York

South Carolina

Virginia
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State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d
803 (Iowa 1980); State v.
Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa
1978); State v. Hackett, 200
N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972).
Azbill v. State, 495 P.2d 1064
(Nev. 1972); Ransey v. State,
594 P.2d 1157 (Nev. 1979);
Basurto v. State, 472 P.2d 339
(Nev. 1970).
Commonwealth v. Spencer,
263 A.2d 923 (Pa. 1970);
Commonwealth v. Gartner,
381 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1977);
Commonwealth v. Lambert,
299 A.2d 240 (Pa. 1973).
People v. Aponte, 759
N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003); People v. Abston, 645
N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318
(S.C. 2002); State v. Lynn, 284
S.E.2d 786 (S.C. 1981); State
v. Singleton, 460 S.E.2d 573
(S.C. 1995).
Poindexter v. Commonwealth,
191 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1972);
Prieto v. Commonwealth, 682
S.E.2d 910 (Va. 2009).

C. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test

Alabama

Utah

Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d
347 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000);
Daily v. State, 828 So. 2d 344
(Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
State v. Harry, 2008 UT App
224, 189 P.3d 98; State v.
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1988); State v. Cruz, 206
UT App 234, 387 P.3d 618.
State v. Spence, 376 S.E.2d
618 (W. Va. 1988); State v.
Waldron, 624 S.E.2d 887 (W.
Va. 2005).

D. Presentation of the Allen Charge

Delaware

Kansas

Missouri

Texas

Wyoming

Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d
821 (Del. 1994); Brown v.
State, 369 A.2d 682 (Del.
1976); Collins v. State, 56 A.3d
1012 (Del. 2012).
State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d
278 (Kan. 1994); State v.
Roadenbaugh, 673 P.2d 1166
(Kan. 1983); State v. Gomez,
143 P.3d 92 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006).
City of St. Charles v. Hal-Tuc,
Inc., 841 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Dewitt,
924 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); State v. Carl, 389
S.W.3d 276 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d
160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989);
Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d
585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985);
Barnett v. State, 189 S.W.3d
272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14
(Wyo. 1969); Carter v. State,
2016 WY 36, 369 P.3d 220
(Wyo. 2016); Hoskins v. State,
552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1976).
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APPENDIX V292

292. If included, the decisions of the Washington D.C. circuit create a model
instruction that is classified under the “Co-opted ABA Language” sub-grouping. United
States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also United States v.
Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

